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THE REVIEW OF POLITICS
the invariably poetic construction of the people, and the people themselves envisioned as a poetic, world-making power. This essay pursues these topics by exploring Whitman's reflections on aes thetic democracy and his experimental poetic invocation of the people's voice. The vox populi of Whitman's people, and of the democracy they enact, resides in their constitutive futurity, in the fact that they remain forever a people that is not ... yet.4 Whitman's poetry figures the people as inexhaustibly sublime in that they can be neither captured by representation nor finally embodied by political institutions.5 For Whitman, in effect, "the people are always more and less than the people."6 The democratic attachments Whitman hoped to engender through his poetry revolve around the vivifying sublimity of this paradox of the people never at one with itself. While in certain respects Whitman's democratic faith resembles the "democratic aestheticism" cele brated in Kateb's influential work on Whitman, I argue that Whitman's is ulti mately a more radically democratic vision than Kateb's Emersonian interpretation allows. Whitman's aesthetic democracy does not simply call for "receptivity or responsiveness to as much of the world as possible," but for an embrace of a world always in the process of becoming other than it is.7 Whitman offers contemporary democratic theorists a distinct 4Slavoj Zizek has explored the significant transformation of the politics of "the people" into the politics of "a people" in Tarrying Beyond this widely shared cultural nationalism, Whitman's early political commitments also owed much to the Founding generation's republican lega cies. Jefferson's distinctly American civic republicanism was particularly important to Whitman's early political education; the material requirements of independent citizenship, the importance of land availability, and the turn away from the authority of the past, all appear in Whitman's writing, early and late. Indeed, the transformation of Jeffersonian ideology during the presi dency of Andrew Jackson-in particular its urbanization-profoundly marked the political climate of Whitman's childhood. As his biographers emphasize, Whitman was born into a family of working-class Jacksonian democrats, and his father was an ardent admirer of Jefferson and Paine.10 Whitman's early the "world as it is" to engender a politically enlivening sense of the people's poetic 
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THE REVIEW OF POLITICS political involvements and his newspaper editorials of the 1830s and 1840s rarely deviated from this Jeffersonian-jacksonian ideological framework.11 Reading Whitman's later work solely through the lens of these earlier pol itical commitments, however, does not explain Whitman's idiosyncratic use of key terms like "democracy" and "the people" in the writing for which he is best known: Leaves of Grass, beginning with the 1855 publication. Unlike Noah Webster, who warned readers against using these words precisely because their advocates "have never defined what they mean by the people, or what they mean by democracy," Whitman used their polyvocality to his poetic and political advantage.12 Whitman's distinctive contribution to American political thought is obscured when the politics of his writings are reduced to his early political affiliations and party activism.
The publication of Leaves came during a period of widely perceived social and political crisis that coincided with an extraordinary flowering of American literature: The Scarlet Letter, Representative Men, Moby-Dick, Pierre, Uncle Tom's Cabin, Walden, The House of the Seven Gables, and Leaves of Grass were all published between 1850 and 1855. David Reynolds has convincingly argued that this literary flowering should be understood as a response to the period's social and political turbulence. Whitman's literary response to the political events unfolding around him was twofold: on the one hand, and fol lowing other political romantics, he invoked a broadened understanding of literature and poetry for political ends; on the other, he turned away from institutions to an unmediated understanding of the people as the only reliable source of democratic regeneration. Whitman's vision of "aesthetic democracy" emerged from the interconnectedness of this twofold response. The social and political crisis of the 1850s was marked by widespread political corruption, a widening gap between rich and poor, rising immigration and corresponding anti-immigrant feeling, high urban death rates, and a frag mented political system in the wake of the death of the old party system.13
Overwhelming all these factors, of course, was the expanding power of Office-holders, office-seekers, robbers, pimps, exclusives, malignants, con spirators, murderers, fancy-men, post-masters, custom-house clerks, con tractors, kept-editors, spaniels well-trained to carry and fetch ... pimpled men, scarred inside with the vile disorder, gaudy outside with gold chains made from people's money and harlot's money twisted together; crawling, serpentine men, the lousy combings and born freedom sellers of the earth. (E, 1337-38) In passages like this-and this text has many like it-Whitman expressed the period's common suspicion of institutional politics and institutions of all kinds. He also exemplified the tone and temper of much of the writing circu lating in mid-nineteenth-century America. Departing from the purported ratio-critical norms of the public sphere, political debate in the period was marked by passionate invective, sentimental appeal, defamation, and the widespread recognition of the political uses of vehemence, disdain, and contempt.14 Much of this literature was written in the name of reform of one kind or another. The reform movements that characterized the political culture of antebellum America had by the 1850s been radicalized by their evangelical and deeply antiauthoritarian constituencies. "Ultraism" was a term in 
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THE REVIEW OF POLITICS common use in the period to designate this radicalized brand of reform poli tics and to distinguish it from its reasoned, deliberative, largely Unitarian variant.15 Ultraists believed that individuals could be sanctified while on earth and used this moral perfectionism to argue against the complicity of compromise, institutional mediation, and political deliberation. The resulting animus against mediating institutions was compounded by a fiery renewal of antinomian thought and sensibility in the period. The mediation of language itself was suspect for some of the age's more enthusiastic radical lights, as in John Brown's insistence on "action! action!" But even less revolutionary, more intellectual writers appreciated the impulse. Thoreau, for example, had pub licly noted and celebrated precisely this aspect of Brown. "He was not a rhet orician," Thoreau said shortly after Brown's thwarted raid on Harper's Ferry, but "the greatest of preachers." "He did not set up even a political graven image between him and his God."16 Emerson, too, noted the "fertile forms of antinomianism" that thrived in antebellum America, allowing for a "keener scrutiny of institutions and domestic life." 17
Whitman was accused of participating in this antinomian reaction to what both he and Emerson characterized as the "fossilism" of inherited institutions. As he wrote in the first edition of Leaves (1855), "Unscrew the locks from the doors!/ Unscrew the doors themselves from their jambs!" (LG, 50) In the "Calamus" section of the second edition of Leaves (1862), Whitman responded to those who criticized this anti-institutionalist or antinomian aspect of the first volume, evident in both its content and in its abandonment of inherited poetic forms (about which, more below):
I HEAR it was charged against me that I sought to destroy institutions, But really I am neither for nor against institutions, (What indeed have I in common with them? or what with the destruction of them?) (LG, 281) Whitman's indifference to institutions led, at times, to a reiteration of the period's common invocation of the force and power of immediacy: "We want no reforms," Whitman wrote, "no institutions, no parties-We want a living principle as nature has, under which nothing can go wrong" (W, 62). Library of America, 1990), 361-79, 363. capitulate to badges and names, to large societies and dead institutions." 18 For Whitman, however, overcoming the weight of these inherited institutions came not only from a spiritualized invocation of "nature," or the self-reliant individual (however removed from individualism or sovereign mastery the Emersonian individual, properly understood, might be), but from a direct turn to "the people" in whose name these putatively democratic institutions ruled. In the 1850s' crisis of social and political institutions, Whitman glimpsed new possibilities for fulfilling their hindered democratic prospects, a promise of democratic regeneration through the aesthetic transformation of everyday life. The crisis of the 1850s was understood by many of the era's writers as a crisis of both politics and meaning-a crisis in representation broadly under stood.19 Responding to unfolding events in "Bloody Kansas," for example, Emerson wrote that "language has lost its meaning in the universal cant. Representative government is really misrepresentative ... Manifest Destiny, Democracy, Freedom, fine names for an ugly thing .... They call it chivalry and freedom; I call it the stealing of all the earnings of a poor man and his little girl and boy."20 Whitman wrote Leaves to address both levels of this rep resentational crisis, but in doing so he did not aim to turn away from the cor ruption and complicity of politics altogether (as some have argued Thoreau did at Walden Pond). Instead, he looked to the latent resources of democratic life, particularly as manifest in America's growing cities, to restore the poetic vitality of both politics and language. While on the surface America's political institutions seemed compromised and diminishing of individuality (a point frequently reiterated in the writing of Emerson and Thoreau), Whitman believed political engagement and encounter carried a deeper significance, one "descending below laws ... [and] social routines," (W, 145), and over looked by widespread ultraist condemnations of politics.
Admitting the "vile" and "incompetent" people sometimes put forward in a democracy, Whitman nevertheless wrote that "shams, etc. will always be 18Emerson, "Self-Reliance" in Selected Essays, ed. Larzer Ziff (New York: Penguin, 1982) , 179. 19Describing 
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THE REVIEW OF POLITICS the show, like ocean's scum; enough, if waters deep and clear make up the rest. Enough that while the piled embroidery shoddy gaud and fraud spreads to the superficial eye, the hidden warp and weft are genuine and will wear forever" (DV, 978). Like Thoreau and Emerson, Whitman recog nized the "threatening evils" of political democracy-all three were particu larly troubled by democracy's averaging forces and "statistical" propensities-but Whitman also found resources to combat these evils, not only in fathomless, spiritualized "nature," but in the very "roar of cities and the broil of politics" that Emerson's essay "Nature" posits as a dangerous or distracting artifice.2' "To attack the turbulence and destructiveness of the Democratic spirit," Whitman wrote, "is an old story .... But with the noble Democratic spirit-even accompanied by its freaks and its excesses-no people can ever become enslaved."22 Whitman believed spaces of political contest-in his words, the "arenas" or "gymnasiums" of freedom-were the necessary forums for creating the asser tively independent citizens required for a regenerative democracy of everyday life, for the transformative poetics of everyday citizenship, understood as a lived practice rather than a juridical category. Political contest was not simply subject to overarching moral purpose for Whitman. He figured the political not as an instrumentalized realm serving competing ends, nor as a debased or diminishing distraction from the stylized cultivation of the self. His high evaluation of political engagement and contention-his estimation of its "restorative" capacities-clearly distinguishes Whitman from both his Emersonian and ultraist contemporaries. It also gives passages like the follow ing their resounding noninstrumentalist resonance: "A brave delight, fit for freedom's athletes, fills these arenas, and fully satisfies, out of the action in them, irrespective of success" (DV, 976). The action that Whitman believes these forums for democratic citizenship engender is explicitly agonistic: "I think agitation is the most important factor of all," Whitman writes, "the most deeply important. To stir, to question, to suspect, to examine, to denounce!" (C, IV, 30) "Vive, the attack-the perennial assault!" (DV 976) Leaves at once speaks for and elicits a self capable of flourishing amidst the suspend the opposition between them. Take, for example, a passage from Democratic Vistas that Kateb also quotes, in part: "Bibles may convey, and priests expound, but it is exclusively for the noiseless operation of the isolated Self, to enter the pure ether of veneration, reach the divine levels, and commune with the unutterable" (DV 989). The antinomianism of this passage-"commune with the unutterable"-is clearly reminiscent of Emerson's early essays and even carries with it the trace of theological contro versy. But then, the very next line-"To practically enter into politics is an important part of American personalism" (DV, 989)-reasserts Whitman's embrace of political action as constitutive of the self. The practical and affective organization of democratic life below the level of institutions and laws was Whitman's primary concern after 1855 and is essen tial to his vision of aesthetic democracy and to the poetics of citizenship that it enacts. While this position was elaborated in the preface to the first edition of Leaves, Democratic Vistas stated it best:
For not only is it not enough that the new blood, new frame of democracy shall be vivified and held together merely by political means, superficial suffrage, legislation, etc., but it is clear to me that unless it goes deeper, gets at least as firm and warm a hold in men's hearts, emotions and belief, as, in their days, feudalism or ecclesiasticism, and inaugurates its own perennial sources, welling from the center forever, it strengths will be defective, its growth doubtful, and its main charm wanting (DV, 959).
According to Whitman, American democracy's crisis of the 1850s could not be resolved by reorganizing political institutions, but only by addressing what Kateb has insightfully termed a particular "stylization of life," "a distinctive set of appearances, habits, rituals, dress, ceremonies, folk traditions and his torical memories." However, while Kateb sees this concern as "secondary at best," and fears its nationalistic or collectivist tendencies, it was here that the promise of aesthetic interventions into democratic life became most evident to Whitman; on this explicitly aesthetic terrain, contemporary democratic theor ists may have the most to learn from Whitman.23
II
As newspaper editor for the Brooklyn Eagle and the Aurora, Whitman already appreciated the political power of words to shape political action and educate 23Kateb, The Inner Ocean, 240.
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THE REVIEW OF POLITICS citizens. He was a committed participant in what historian Richard Brown has characterized as America's evolving "discourse of the informed citizen," which identified education and the free circulation of information in an open public sphere as the primary basis for securing independent citi zenship and the stability of free government.24 Vhitman participated in this discourse, but he also critiqued it, particularly in his literary contri butions, as they came to be valued as an extension of his editorial and journal istic efforts. As Betsy Erkkila has written, "[T]he publication of Leaves of Grass in 1855 was not an escape from politics but a continuation of politics by other means."25 It was a continuation, however, that also marked a transformation in Whitman's conceptualization of politics. Whitman's work was no longer engaged principally in contending over particular issues or clarifying ideo logical positions; instead, Whitman addressed the overall condition of the polity as what he called a "passionate body," elaborating the "electric" or "resonant" interconnections between the utter singularity of the self and the multitudinous and contending voices of democratic politics.26 Art intended, Whitman wrote, "to serve the people," and when it failed to do so it was "false to its promises" (C, IV, 4). The preface to the first edition of
Leaves (1855) (LG, 89)
Whitman likened his attempt to move or "touch" the reader poetically with the power of oratory and the spoken word in antebellum political culture. Discussing the power of oratory in the period, Emerson wrote that the orator's word should not be distinguished from action. "It is the electricity of action. It is action, as the general's word of command or chart of battle is action." Because oratory was closely associated with the crowds that often populate Whitman's poetry, however, some writers associated it with demo cratic unreason and the dangers of popular tyranny. Thoreau, for instance, took a more suspicious view of oratorical power when he wrote that the "orator yields to the inspiration of the transient occasion, and speaks to the mob before him, to those who can hear him; but the writer ... who would be distracted by the event and the crowd which inspire the orator, speaks to the intellect and the heart of mankind, to all in any age who can understand him."27 Whitman, in contrast, wanted the reader to hear his songs as much as understand them; he regularly situates himself within the clamor of the crowd rather than aspiring to rise above it. In his American Primer Whitman wrote that the ideal writer should be able to do with words "any thing, that man or woman or the natural powers can do" (AP, 598). Whitman wanted his words to touch his readers and move them toward democratic rejuvenation.
The connections Whitman sought to establish with the reader, and to dis seminate in the political culture of the time, were explicitly affective and erotic.28 As Whitman wrote in the "Calamus" section of Leaves of Grass, he wanted readers to thrust him beneath their clothing, "to feel the throbs of their heart, to rest upon their hips" (LG, 271). Examining passages such as these, Allen Grossman has argued that Whitman's overriding concern in his 27Emerson, "Eloquence," in The hence the dense politicality of all bodily experiences, erotic and otherwise" (4).
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THE REVIEW OF POLITICS poetry and its public orientation was with an "infinite distributability of affec tionate presence." Whitman hoped to press in upon his readers as the surging crowds of Manhattan pressed in upon themselves and him, but-and this is again in contrast to Emerson and Thoreau-he envisioned this proliferation of contact as stimulating difference rather than diminishing the individual. The urban crowds among which Whitman so often positions himself in his writings are his model carriers of "presence" and, as such, the markers of a representational limit. Grossman argues that Whitman's intention to rid transactions of "all representational mediation" is the reason for his interest in "phrenology, his dislike of political parties, poetic diction, mythology, and so on."29 Whitman's attempts to overcome political and written mediation in his poetry also illuminate the peculiar way that he invokes democracy in his writing. Instead of arguing for the legitimacy of democratic politics in the American setting, the goal of Whitman's work was to provoke and dissemi nate a democratic sensibility that shaped the experiences of individuals below the cognitive level of conviction or even persuasion. "I and mine," he writes, "do not convince by arguments, similes, rhymes. We convince by associates with democracy would become a part of the (electric) organization of the body (politic) itself. Whitman's turn away from established channels of institutionalized politics in favor of aesthetic intervention into political life at the micropolitical level3l has led some commentators to accuse him of abandoning faith in democratic politics altogether. One version of this argument suggests that Whitman's turn to aesthetics corresponds to a tum toward a "spiritual democracy," or an attempt by an elite class of poet-legislators "to overcome the practice of politics as a collective decision-making process."32 In this reading, Whitman's reference to "democratic despots" in Democratic Vistas is under stood as an all-too-literal reference to a despotic poetic class rather than to the self-enacting or autopoetic aspect of democratic politics itself. Others have more plausibly argued that an often unrecognized "dark side" taints Whitman's putatively democratic politics, his loathing of corrupt institutions "seep[ing] through to a disdain for the people themselves."33 According to this interpretation, Whitman exhibits the familiar conflict of left-wing intellec tuals who want to celebrate the common man, while often showing disdain for actually existing people. Both readings attribute to Whitman a "Romantic" or "Rousseauian" longing for authentic and unalienated exist ence, a longing they then place at the heart of Whitman's critique of actually existing democracy. Such arguments neglect Whitman's political and stylistic departures from earlier forms of political romanticism, departures which shape his claim to be a democratic poet. For Whitman, not only was poetry a kind of democratic action, but democratic action should itself be understood as a kind of poetry. Whitman's poetry presented a "vulgar" or "promiscuous" democratic people to themselves as sublime and worthy of inspiring aesthetic appreciation and emulation rather than embarrassment or disgust.34 He did so not to further enhance Americans' habitual self-regard, but to invigorate the generous, autopoetic potentials already latent in the people themselves. The highly indi vidualized Romantic vision of the poet-legislator-best captured by Percy Bysshe Shelley's rapturous account of poets as the "unacknowledged legislators of the World" -attracted Whitman, but he ultimately rejected this vision, along with the lyric poetry associated with it, as didactic, elitist, and antidemocratic.35
Whitman is poorly read as "first, last and nothing else but a lyric poet, self centered, individualistic, in the tradition of the great individualistic Romantic writers and poets."36 The heroic vision of the poet did appeal to Whitman in its idealism and in the emphasis it placed on the world-making capacity of words. Emerson's essay "The Poet," which Whitman greatly admired, captured this capacity through its invocation of the poet as "the sayer, the namer .... He is a sovereign, and stands on the centre."37 However, Whitman ultimately resisted this unitary, undemocratic vision of the poet/author/authority; his designation as the paradigmatic democratic poet emerges from his resistance to this familiar Romantic conception. Whitman's most sustained confrontation with this Romantic vision is found in his writings on Thomas Carlyle. For Whitman, Carlyle's work best exempli fied the antidemocratic temptation of modem times, and his response to
Carlyle clearly articulates his own contrary vision of the form giving or autop oetic power of the people themselves. Whitman agreed with Carlyle that theirs was a time of crisis and fundamental uncertainty: would it be "enoble ment," Carlyle asked, or would it be "death?" Where Carlyle saw the greatest danger, however, Whitman saw promise and opportunity. Carlyle's disdain for the democratic masses, which he characterized as "swarmery" ("the gath ering of men in swarms," from the German Schwarmarei and associated with the English term "enthusiasm"),38 was dismissed by Whitman as a symptom of dyspepsia or the improper digestion of the spirit of the age. writers were suspicious of quantitative or utilitarian visions of democracy, those which embraced the principle that the "Count of Heads" was "to be the Divine Court of Appeal on every question and interest of mankind."40 But Whitman had faith in the ability of the people themselves to resist their statistical reduction to so many "dreams or dots" (LG, 9). In "Shooting Niagara"-the essay to which Whitman's Democratic Vistas responds-Carlyle warned his "Aristo" readers to avoid the impracticality of literature. He did this in part because his own attempts to unify aes thetics and politics (in Chartism, for example) had proven woefully ineffec tive.41 No longer clinging to hopes for a heroic "literatus" (Whitman's term), or poet, Carlyle in Shooting Niagara longed for a new aristocratic union of title and nature. Carlyle expressed a wish that "the entire popu lation" could "be thoroughly drilled," and called on the throne to provide such a system, thereby taking a stand against the "dirt, disorder, nomad ism, disobedience, folly and confusion" of democracy.42 Whitman's poetry, in contrast, created a sublime "image-making work" of this very same democratic spectacle. Whitman understood Carlyle's nostalgic longing for the heroic individ ual's reappearance as a futile though understandable temptation, which forced him to ask how democracy itself could produce the greatness of character usually associated with aristocratic culture, and not invariably diminish or threaten individual singularity. "My utmost pretension," Whitman wrote in Specimen Days, "is probably but to offset that old claim of the exclusively curative power of first-class individual men, as leaders and rulers, by the claims, and general movement and result, of ideas. Something of the latter kind seems to me the distinctive theory of America, of democracy, and of the modern-or rather I should say it is democracy, and it is the modern" (SD, 916). "Democracy," "America," and "the Modern," were, for Whitman, "convertible terms." His invocation of Hegel-implicit here, explicit elsewhere-guided Whitman further away from heroic individualists like Carlyle, not only to an understanding of the movement of ideas and spirit, but also to embracing the insufficiency of the individual and the importance of the constitutive aspects of human relations. 
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In Hegel, Whitman found the insight that truth is not in "any one party, or any one form of government," but in the "just relations of objects to each other" (SD, 920) . The struggles between objects-the dialectic-reveal truth, Whitman writes, in the "endless process of Creative thought." This line of thinking brings Whitman to a question central to his own autopoetic understanding of democ racy. "What is the fusing explanation and tie," Whitman asks, "what relationship between the (radical democratic) Me, the human identity of understanding, emotions, spirit, &c, on the one side, and the (conservative) Not Me, the whole material objective universe and laws, with what is behind them in time and space, on the other side?" (SD, 919) Whitman took the opposition here between his "(radical democratic) Me" and the intransigent "conservative" existence of the material world from his admiring encounter with German idealism. But why is the "Me" characterized by Whitman as "radical democratic" rather than, as we might expect, "free," for example, or "moral?" If Romantic writers tended to see the poet as the text's sole originator and author/authority, Whitman works again and again to decenter this relationship. Even the poetic "Me" or "I" is not one for Whitman, but many; it is democratic in its very plurality and in its "nomadism." As Whitman famously asks in Leaves, "Do I contradict myself?/ Very well then ... I contradict myself;/ I am large ... I contain multi tudes" (LG, 87) . Kateb has suggested that such moments in Whitman's work point to an inexhaustible inner reservoir of potentiality, and Kateb convincingly emphasizes the gap between the conscious (one might say representational) limit ations of Whitman's "self" and the depths of his secularized understanding of "soul." For Kateb, this is the basis of Whitman's ethics, for "to admit one's compo siteness and ultimate unknowability is to open oneself to a kinship to others which is defined by receptivity and responsiveness to them."44 This abiding sense of inner strangeness that we recognize in others, and which leads us to be receptive of their singularity, is crucial to Kateb's identi fication of an Emersonian perfectionist ideal in Whitman's work. But for Whitman the inner strangeness his "(radical democratic) Me" encounters results not from the primary ineffability of solitude, but from the sublime potentialities of relational democratic life itself. The inexhaustible resources of potentiality that Kateb finds in Whitman's "democratic personality" do not lie first in the inner strangeness that then opens to the receptivity of another; instead, this inner strangeness or uncanniness is better understood as a product of democratic encounter, as an effect of the multivoiced constitution of the democratic self. Whitman's account of the interconnection between demo cratic politics and democratic language richly explores this sublime effect of democracy (it production of a multitudinous democratic self), and Whitman hopes to further enact this effect by ventriloquizing the myriad and changing voices that constitutes the vox populi. Arguably, the very attempt to capture poe tically the sublimely polyphonic voice of the people-to serve as an aesthetic 44Kateb, The Inner Ocean, 252.
Whitman believed that the received traditions of European lyric poetry sought to avoid precisely this inclusive heteroglossic dimension of language. Like Bakhtin, Whitman believed that the lyrical poetic form evinced an unde mocratically unitary theory of the subject as expressed by speech. To combat this conception of self, Whitman initiated his radically innovative "demo cratic" changes within poetic discourse and form. (Bakhtin famously gave up on studying "discourse in poetry" altogether and turned instead to the novel.) For both writers, an implicit and faulty understanding of the relation ship between language and the self stood behind lyric poetry's aspirations and its attempt to cleanse language of heteroglot associations. It was not the poetry, in other words, but the assumptions about subjectivity behind the poetry that both writers found politically suspect. As Bakhtin writes,
In poetic genres, artistic consciousness-understood as a unity of all the author's semantic and expressive intentions-fully realizes itself within its own language; in them alone is such consciousness fully immanent, expressing itself in it directly and without mediation, without conditions and without distance. The language of the poet is his language, he is utterly immersed in it, inseparable from it, he makes use of each form, each word, each expression according to its unmediated power to assign meaning (as it were, "without quotation marks"), that is as a pure and direct expression of his own intention.48 Like Bakhtin, Whitman was acutely aware that speakers never come to language "without quotation marks," that in using language they acknowl edge indebtedness to others and that one cannot assume a "complete single Bakhtin instead urged that the individual be grasped as an effect of the het eroglot currents of language itself.51 As we saw above, this means the "inner strangeness" one might encounter when "accounting with the unutter able" comes from an encounter with one or many internal others. "A person has no interior sovereign territory, he is wholly and always on the boundary; looking inside himself he looks into the eyes of another or with the eyes of another."52 This description resonates with Whitman's "(radical democratic) Me," irreducibly populated with a vast multitude of competing voices, or 
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THE REVIEW OF POLITICS magnetic, or electric, flows of shared sentiment and affirmation between people (but, again, without reducing people to a common mind or substance). In "Calamus," Whitman responds to the "terrible doubt of appearances" in this way:
I cannot answer the question of appearances or that of Identity beyond the grave, But I walk or sit indifferent, I am satisfied, He ahold of my hand has completely satisfied me. (LG, In this "love of man for his comrade," this "attraction of friend to friend," Whitman locates "the base of all metaphysics." If the specter of radical doubt, the impulse of skepticism, or its political corollary in corrosive mistrust cannot be philosophically refuted with confidence, Whitman hoped it might at least be tempered with comradely affection. Whitman's response to skepticism is not a renewed quest for certitude. Instead, it is found in the ordinary gesture of holding a hand; skepticism is here assuaged by copresence. Clearly, Whitman wanted his poetry itself to become something like that reassuring hand. This response to skepticism resides in the relations between people, in their being-in-common rather than being common.56 Whitman is, therefore, misread as a theorist of socialization, or as simply offering his poetry as a vehicle of social cohesion.57 Mere social unification or national identification is foreign to Whitman's invocation of the inexhaustible plenitude of democratic life, to the people's "measureless wealth of power and capacity, their vast artis tic contrasts of lights and shades," and to his aesthetic revaluation of American democracy's vulgar asymmetries and promiscuous inconsistencies into the reg ister of the unrepresentable sublime. The "sublimest part of political history,"
Whitman wrote, "is currently issuing from the American people" (DV, 978 
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THE REVIEW OF POLITICS for them, or absorbed the central spirit and the idiosyncrasies which are theirs-and which, thus, in highest ranges, so far remain entirely uncele brated, unexpressed" (DV, 978). Whitman notes that "literature, strictly speaking, has never recognized the people" (DV, 968). His pursuit of a poetic "image-making work" aimed to provide democracy with multiple images for imitation and adaptation-images taken from the sublime resources of the people themselves. The people in "their measureless wealth of latent power and capacity, their vast, artistic contrast of lights and shades" provide Whitman with his material. He is not imposing it upon them (heteronomically), but performing an aesthetic translation of what is already immanent to their democratic practices. "He strangely trans mutes them,/ They are not vile any more ... they hardly know themselves, they are so grown"(LG, 131). "The people are ungrammatical" and "untidy," but Whitman's work does not aim to clean them up or subject them to the laws of grammar (or codified rules of justice). Unlike Carlyle, for example, who aimed to provide a voice for the mute force of Chartism's popular crowds, Whitman's invocation of the people speaks from and among them. Like William Hazlitt-who opens his essay "What is the People?" with the quick response "And who are you to ask that ques tion?"67 Whitman refuses the division between himself and the people. As Larzer Ziff perceptively notes, Whitman makes the "democratic audience the author of the poems of its poet."68 In this paradoxical claim to provide an aesthetic translation of the people's independent, but not self-identical, and sublime voice, the people are figured at once as the inexhaustible inspi ration and the effect of poetic mediation. Whitman's work reveals the vox populi not to be a predetermined unity, or a national expression, but instead a provisional effect or claim.69 If Whitman's project was not merely to give aesthetic expression to the inar ticulate yet preexisting sovereign voice of the people, neither was it simply to represent the people accurately. Poetry for Whitman should not aim merely to represent accurately an independent reality, but to enact a new reality. Again, 
